A future Secretary of State, Dean Acheson would later describe
himself as being present "at the creation" of the vast changes in the
world order that followed World War II. He was instrumental in the
implementation of the Marshall Plan for European recovery and in the
creation of NATO. Acheson, a Democrat, was "of counsel" to Arizona in
this case, meaning that he assisted with the briefing of the case but took
no part in the oral argument. Interestingly, from 1919 to 1921, Acheson
was a former secretary of Justice Brandeis, who wrote the opinion in this
case.
Acheson would also later gain notice of a different kind for his
defense of Alger Hiss in the early nineteen-fifties, against Senator
Joseph McCarthy's accusations of spying. He ended his term as Secretary
of State in 1953 and thereafter served as a Presidential advisor.
Justice Louis Brandeis
Louis Dembitz Brandeis was born in 1856 in Kentucky, and was
educated in Germany before he attended Harvard Law School.
Brandeis was an activist lawyer throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. His vigorous actions on behalf of workers and unions won him a great deal of attention as a progressive legal scholar, his cases including antitrust actions against railroad monopolies in New England, attempts to secure low-cost life insurance for workers in Massachusetts, and shorter working hours for working women in many states.
Brandeis was among the first to use social science as justification for "public policy" legal arguments. A public policy argument is one in which an attorney argues that an outcome which favors their client also protects some important public interest. An argument which basis this public policy evaluation on social science (instead of the more usual legal theory) is still called a "Brandeis brief" after its originator.
When he was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Woodrow Wilson in 1916 (the first Jew ever to attain the position), he quickly became known as a supporter of judicial conservatism, in which the Court rules as narrowly as possible on the arguments before it, and continued his progressive work, especially vigorous in attempting to protect New Deal legislation from being struck down by the political conservatives of the court.
You can clearly examples of both Brandeis' judicial conservatism and social progressivism in this opinion. After Brandeis left the court in 1941, he continued his activism in the American Zionist movement.
To get some idea of how long Arizona v. California has been pending in the
courts, when Brandeis was appointed to the Supreme Court, the Imperial
Valley irrigation effort had been underway for eleven years. When
Brandeis died, his Supreme Court seat was filled by Justice Douglas, who
would dissent in the 1963 Arizona v. California decision. When Douglas
died, his Supreme Court seat was filled by Justice Stevens, who would
dissent in the 1983 Arizona v. California decision and who will hear the
argument this month in the latest incarnation of the case.
Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur
Wilbur, a Californian, was a doctor, who was a public health officer when
the typhoid epidemic of 1902 hit. He said in his memoirs that at 4:30 in
the morning his duties called him to go down with a shotgun to a
particularly virulent and recalcitrant dairy farm to make sure that no
typhoid-infected milk left the premises.
He was Dean of the Standford Medical School, later President of Stanford. As President, he denied the Ku Klux Klan the right to use campus buildings. He also was active in the Save-the-Redwoods League, an early conservation group.
Justice James
McReynolds
Another Kentuckian liberal and Wilson appointee, Justice
James Clark McReynolds was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1914, after
serving two stints as Attorney General of the United States, when he made
legal history with the first-ever antitrust suit against AT&T. McReynolds
dissented very briefly in this case.
The story of Hoover Dam's construction is ably (and
terrifyingly) told in Ken Burns' tremendously good "American Experience"
episode of that name. Constructed at the height of the Depression, the
Hoover Dam became in many ways a symbol of hope for desperate workers who
needed, first, work, at whatever price, and second, reassurance that
America's greatness lay ahead and not behind. America has never been
closer to revolution than it was during the Great Depression, but it was
at that time that the dam at issue in this case was constructed.
Before you go any further in the opinion, think a little bit
about how Congress decided to fund the construction of Hoover Dam.
Congress issued bonds
which were purchased by private investors. The money from the sale was
used to build the dam. The turbines on the dam are capable of producing
up to 2 gigawatts of power. The sale of hydroelectric power from the dam
was then to be used to pay back the bonds over the next forty years. It
went perfectly according to plan, and Hoover Dam has been solvent ever
since. What problems do you see with this approach to large government
works like dams? What advantages do you see? Does it make a difference
if the government work is a National Park whose entrance fees are meant to
pay for the maintenance of the park?
The
Hoover Dam is still alive and well, producing power and regulating the
flow of the Colorado. Visit
the Department of the Interior's Hoover Dam homepage. The Lake Mead
National Recreation Area created by the dam receives about nine million
visitors every year.
The Commerce Clause is in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution:
The Congress ahall have Power...To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.It has been used both as a grant of national power (as it is in this case), and as a limitation on state power (the so-called "dormant commerce clause"). In the early days of the nation, riverways were used more often than roads to move goods across state lines, and so the Congress was always concerned with improving the navigability of the rivers. The Commerce Clause was Congress' authorization to undertake these measures.
So, the opinion says, if Congress can legitimately authorize the building of Hoover Dam, then the Dam does not have to be approved by Arizona's state engineer. For Congress to legitimately authorize the building of Hoover Dam, two things must be true:
Ordinarily, because this case came to the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court would take all of Arizona's factual allegations as true. A judge, when looking at a motion to dismiss, assumes for the purposes of deciding the motion that everything the plaintiff says is true. "Even assuming everything you say is true," says the judge mentally, "is there enough of a dispute over facts that there is a case here?"
However, the Court chose to take judicial notice of a contradictory fact,
that the Colorado River is navigable. In fact, there was a bustling
steamboat trade on the Colorado for many decades through the nineteenth
century. Just because the River was not in 1931 used for much trade, if
any, does not mean that it somehow loses its status as a navigable river.
Arizona: The Act's purpose is not really to improve
navigation on the
Colorado, but instead just to steal water under the Compact.
Arizona ingeniously pointed to language in the Compact, whose approval was
a condition for the activation of the Boulder Canyon Project Act. The
Compact even says that the Colorado is
not
navigable. How could the Boulder Canyon Project Act legitimately be
said to be for the purpose of improving navigation if the Compact which
underlies it states that trade on the Colorado is a lost cause?
The Court said that the Supreme Court may not inquire into the motives of Congress in passing a bill unless there is a lot more evidence of an impermissible pretext for the decision than Arizona was able to muster in this case. The Congressional authorization to build Hoover Dam said that navigation was one of its purposes, and whatever the Compact might say, Congress' intent is the question.
Arizona: Even if Congress did mean to improve
navigation through the Act, the Act is still invalid because it impairs
Arizona's legal right to appropriate water from the Colorado
There is a fairly good summary of Arizona's position in the court opinion
itself. The standard law of rivers indicates that unused portions of a
river may be "appropriated" and used in accordance with the laws of the
state in which the river is found, so long as the use of the water doesn't
restrict anyone who has put the waters to use before. For example, if I
divert water from the Colorado in Nevada to irrigate my field, so long as
I leave enough that people downstream from me can use the same amount they
always have, and follow the laws of Nevada, I acquire a right to divert
that same amount of water every year afterwards, by appropriation.
Arizona's contention in this case is that the Boulder Canyon Project Act will prevent it from appropriating the water it needs from the Colorado River to develop its irrigable lands.
Why follow the doctrine of "prior appropriation"? Early law about rivers were most concerned with eliminating "waste" - defined as water which actually reached the sea unused. Is a river flowing in its natural course really "wasted"? Modern environmental thought says that it is not, but environmental concerns did not inform the legal decision-making of the time. Prior appropriation was a way of encouraging people to develop the natural resources of the river as quickly as possible.
This is nowhere more evident than in the Court's response.